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CLOSING ARGUMENT: PROSECUTION MISCONDUCT 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
A prosecutor's improper comments during closing argu-
ment may "so infect [] the trial with unfairness as to make 
the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Donnelly 
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (197 4). Moreover, ap-
pellate courts throughout the country "have with mounting 
...P frustration expressed concern over the frequency with which 
'"" such improprieties occur." 3 LaFave & Israel, Criminal 
Procedure § 23.5 (1984). 
Unfortunately, Ohio has not escaped difficulties in this 
I context. In State v. DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 288, 528 N.E.2d 542 (1988), the Ohio Supreme Court "express[ed] 
I our mounting alarm over the increasing incidence of mis-conduct by both prosecutors and defense counsel in capital 
[ 
cases." The Court then quoted three provisions of the ethi-
l'" cal rul~s: a lawh yerdsh_al_l nt ott_(1) "[feJngt~ge .. inDcRo1n~u0c2t(tAh)a(t5i)s 
·1·· ()prejudicial to t e a mm1s ra 1on o JUS 1ce, - ; 
i1 . (2) "[k]nowingly make false statements of law or fact," DR 7-
1 02(A)(5); and (3) "[s]tate or allude to any matter that he 
I has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence." DR 7-
106. Finally, the Court announced that ''to preserve the fair-
ness of trial proceedings and to deter further misconduct, it 
is henceforth the intention of this court to refer matters of 
misconduct to the Disciplinary Counsel." ld. at 288. 
This article examines the law of final argument and in 
particular prosecutorial misconduct. See generally 2 Katz & 
Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio Practice Criminal Law § 68.9 
(West 1996}. 
PROSECUTOR'S ROLE 
In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935}, the 
United States Supreme Court condemned a prosecutor's 
summation, commenting: 
The United States attorney is the representative not 
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sover-
eignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that 
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prose-
cute with earnestness and vigor- indeed, he should 
do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to re-
frain from improper methods calculated to provide a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one. 
. .. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinua-
tion and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge 
are apt to carry much weight against the accused 
when they should properly carry none. 
The Court went on to find that the "prosecuting attorney's 
argument to the jury was undignified and intemperate, con-
taining improper insinuations and assertions calculated to 
mislead the jury." I d. at 85. The prosecutor in Berger also 
acted improperly during the trial: 
He was guilty of misstating the facts in his cross-ex-
amination of witnesses; of putting into the mouths of 
such witnesses things which they had not said; of sug-
gesting by his questions that statements had been 
made to him personally out of court, in respect of 
which no proof was offered; of pretending to under-
stand that a witness had said something which he had 
not said and persistently cross-examining the witness 
upon this basis; of assuming prejudicial facts not in ev-
idence; of bullying and arguing with witnesses; and in 
general, conducting himself in a thoroughly indecorous 
and improper manner. ld. at 84. 
The dual aspect of the prosecutor's duty is codified in the 
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-13, which 
states that the "responsibility of a public prosecutor differs 
from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, 
not merely to convict." 
ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
An attorney's argument must be based on the evidence 
adduced at trial. The prosecutor may not "intentionally mis-
state the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it 
may draw." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution 
·Function § 3-5.8(a) (3d ed. 1993). In State v. DePew, 38 
Ohio St.3d 275, 288, 528 N.E.2d 542 (1988), cert. denied, 
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489 U.S. 1042 (1989), the Ohio Supreme Court comment-
ed: "[T]he prosecutor informed the jury of an alleged knife 
fight, which was not in evidence, and implied thereby that 
appellant was guilty of wrongdoing, of which there was ab-
solutely no evidence. Further, the prosecutor commented to 
the jury on subsequent conviction of appellant, unsupported 
by any evidence in the record ... :· Similarly, in State v. 
Braxton, 102 Ohio App.3d 28, 42, 656 N.E.2d 970 (1995), 
the court explained: 
By informing the jury that appellant was suspected of 
running a chop shop, the prosecutor improperly drew 
an inference on matters not supported by the evidence 
and improperly rendered an opinion as to appellant's 
guilt. While we believe the evidence supports a con-
clusion that appellant knowingly received the stolen 
automobile, the prosecutor's comment that appellant 
ran a chop shop went beyond the evidence in the 
record. There was no evidence that other automobile 
parts were stolen nor was it contended that they were 
stolen. 
See also in Burns v. State, 75 Ohio St. 407, 412, 79 N.E. 
929 (1907) ("This statement was improper .... It carried to 
the jury an assumption that the record would, had the state 
been permitted to offer it, show that the accused had been 
an inmate of the penitentiary."). 
Determining what the "evidence" is in a trial raises a num-
ber of subsidiary issues. 
Evidence Admitted Without Objection 
"Unobjected to" evidence that would have been inadmis-
sible had an objection been raised becomes part of the 
record of trial and may be considered for whatever probative 
value it possesses. See 1 Giannelli & Snyder, Ohio 
Evidence§ 103.5 (1996); 1 McCormick, Evidence§ 54, at 
219 (4th ed. 1992) ("If the evidence is received without ob-
jection, it becomes part of the evidence in the case, and is 
usable as proof to the extent of the rational persuasive 
power it may have."). Accordingly, such evidence is subject 
to comment during closing argument. Thus, in State v. 
Richey, 62 Ohio St.3d 353, 362, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1992), the Ohio Supreme Court 
wrote: "By referring to Richey's threats, the prosecutor re-
ferred to evidence in the record admitted without objection." 
Limited Admissibility 
Evidence admitted at trial for one purpose may not be ar-
gued for another purpose. Evidence Rule 1 05 not only di-
rects the court to give a limiting instruction upon request, it 
also requires courts to "restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope." One purpose of this phrase is to limit counsel's use 
of the evidence to its proper purpose during closing argu-
ment. See 1 Giannelli & Snyder, Ohio Evidence§ 105.7 (3d 
ed. 1 996). For example, in Drake v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
15 Ohio St.3d 346,348,474 N.E.2d 291 (1984), the Ohio 
Supreme Court found error where counsel referred in clos-
ing argument to evidence admitted solely for impeachment 
as if such evidence were substantive. See also United 
States v. Gross, 511 F.2d 910, 919 (3d Cir. 1 975), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 924 (1 975). 
Accused's Demeanor 
Comments about a defendant's demeanor at trial may be 
proper because a "defendant's face and body are physical 
evidence." State v. Lawson, 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 347, 595 
N.E.2d 902 (1992) (comment implied accused "so cold and 
callous that he was unaffected by his mother's tearful pleas 
2 
for his life."); State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 317, 528 
N.E.2d 523 (1988) ("A defendant's face and body are physi-
cal evidence."). 
Reasonable Inferences 
Although the attorneys' argument must be based on the 
evidence adduced at trial, counsel have great leeway with 
respect to the inferences that may be drawn from the trial 
evidence. State v. Benge, 75 Ohio St. 3d 136, 141, 661 
N.E.2d 1019 (1996) ("[A] prosecutor is entitled to a certain 
degree of latitude in closing argument."), cert. denied, 117 
S.Ct. 224 (1996); State v. Richey, 62 Ohio St.3d 353, 362, 
595 N.E.2d 915 (1992) ("Prosecutors are entitled to latitude 
as to wharthe evide-nce has shown and what inference can 
be drawn therefrom:'), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1 992); 
State v. Byrd, 32 Ohio St.3d 79, 82, 512 N.E.2d 611 (1 987); 
State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St.2d 76, 82, 263 N.E.2d 777 
(1970). 
MISSTATEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1 967), is one of the most fla-
grant examples of misconduct. A prosecution expert testi-
fied that stains on underwear shorts were type A blood, 
which matched the defendant's blood type. The prosecutor 
waived the "bloody" shorts in front of the jury in closing ar-
gument. Later proceedings established that the stains were 
paint, not blood, and that the prosecutor knew this fact at 
the time of trial. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that "the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tol-
erate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing 
use of false evidence:' 
The significance of scientific evidence is often misstated. 
Cases involving evidence of hair comparisons illustrate this 
point. An expert can rarely make a positive identification 
based on hair analysis; at best, the expert can testify only 
that the crime scene and defendant hair samples are "con-
sistent." In People v. Linscott, 142 111.2d 22, 30, 566 N.E.2d 
1355 (1991 ), the court wrote: 'With these statements, the 
prosecutor improperly argued that the hairs removed from 
the victim's apartment were conclusively identified as com-
ing from defendant's head and pubic region. There simply 
was not testimony at trial to support these statements. 
In fact, [the prosecution experts] and the defense hair expert 
... testified that no such identification was possible." 
Similarly, in Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 
1558 (E. D. Okl. 1995), the prosecutor said in his closing ar-
gument, "[T]here's a match." This argument even confused 
the state court, which wrote: "hair evidence placed [petition-
er) at the decedent's apartment." On habeas, the federal 
court concluded that "the prosecutor's mischaracterization 
of the hair evidence misled the jury .... " ld. at 1557. 
MISSTATEMENTS OF LAW 
Once the trial court has ruled on the final jury instruc-
tions, the attorneys may comment on those instructions. 
Misstatements of law, however, are improper. For example, I 
in State v. Moore, 97 Ohio App.3d 137, 143, 646 N.E.2d 470 
(1994), the court of appeals stated: "Despite this ruling 'fu' : 
[refusing to read a prosecution requested jury instruction on '~, ) I i 
self-defense) the prosecutor argued to the jury in closing 
argument that one loses the claim of self-defense when, 
after reaching a place of safety, that person returns to the 
scene of the confrontation." j 
PERSONAL OPINIONS 
Attorneys, both prosecution and defense, are prohibited 
from stating their personal opinions in closing argument. 
-,The Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility states: "In 
_pppearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a 
lawyer shall not: ... Assert his personal opinion as to the 
justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, ... or 
as to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may 
argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or 
conclusion with resf)ect to the matters stated herein." DR 7-
106(C)(4). Similarly, ABA Criminal Justice Standard§ 3-
5.8(b)(2) (3d ed. 1993) provides: "The prosecutor should 
not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the 
truth or falsity of any testimony or evid!=lnce or the guilt of 
the defendant." 
Numerous cases have addressed this issue. For exam-
ple, in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), the 
United States Supreme Court commented: "Improper sug-
gestions, insinuation and, especially, assertions of personal 
knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the ac-
cused when they should properly carry none." See also 
State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068 
(1996) ("The prosecutor improperly injected his personal 
opinion that Hill lied."); State v. Appanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 
19, 24, 514 N.E.2d 394 (1987); State v. Hall, 106 Ohio 
App.3d 183, 190, 665 N.E.2d 728 (1995) ("[l]t is improper 
for a prosecutor to offer her personal opinion as to the ve-
racity of a witness during closing argument, though she may 
r 
properly suggest that the evidence in the record belies a 
witness's testimony."); State v. Braxton, 102 Ohio App.3d 
11,)'11
: 28, 42, 656 N.E.2d 970 (1995) ("[A] prosecutor should not dl Oexpress his personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of 
I 
a witness or as to the guilt of an accused or allude to mat-
1
/ ters that are not supported by admissible evidence.") (citing 
State v. Smith 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 
I {1984)). 
I 
APPEAL TO PREJUDICES & EMOTIONS 
A prosecutor "should not make arguments calculated to 
appeal to the prejudices of the jury." ABA Criminal Justice 
Standard 3-5.8(c) (3d ed. 1993). This type of argument 
may also violate due process. The Ohio Supreme Court 
has remarked that "a conviction based solely on the inflam-
mation of fears and passions, rather than proof of guilt, re-
quires reversal." State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 409, 
613 N.E.2d 203 (1993). The Court also stated that a prose-
cutor may not "saturate trial with emotion. . . . Excessively 
emotional arguments may deny due process. In our view, 
the prosecutor's histrionic approach to this case crossed the 
line that separates permissible fervor from a denial of a fair 
trial." The Court censured the prosecutor for 
J),:i l 
substituting emotion for reasoned advocacy in his clos-
ing arguments. He expressly encouraged the jury to 
react emotionally to the evidence, specially the grue-
some photographs of Klann's corpse. . . . [H]e en-
couraged the jurors to regard those feelings as rele-
vant- indeed, central -to their task. In the prose-
cutor's argument, the role of the photographs was not 
evidentiary; it was visceral. ld. at 407-08. 
See also State v. Hall, 106 Ohio App.3d 183, 190, 665 
N.E.2d 728 (1995) ("They were inflammatory and certainly 
improper."). 
3 
REFERENCES TO DEFENDANT 
A prosecutor's description of the defendant as a "mag-
gof' is "unprofessional and is deserving of a stern admoni-
tion." State v. Chandler, 19 Ohio App.3d 1 09, 111-12, 483 
N.E.2d 192 (1984). The court elaborated: 
The word . . . has no specific application. It conveys 
no proper information to the jury. It is nothing more 
than a general derogatory epithet. The use of such 
language serves only to subvert our trial system. Just 
and accurate verdicts are likely to be rendered only if 
the jury is able to maintain objectivity .... The prose-
cutor's references to the appellant as a "creep" and a 
"vicious criminal" are also devoid of useful information 
Similarly, the terms "thugs" and "goons" are improper. State 
v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 590, 433 N.E.2d 561 
(1982). 
In contrast, labelling the defendant an "animal" is not per 
se improper, according to the Ohio Supreme Court. State v. 
Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 408, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993) 
("Such invective is not unfair per se .... ") (citing Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1986)). The Court went 
on to acknowledge: "Realism compels us to recognize that 
criminal trials cannot be squeezed dry of all feeling." ld. at 
409. Moreover, in another case the Court concluded that 
the "prosecutor's reference to Richey as a sociopath or psy-
chopath was a fair inference based on the evidence." State 
v. Richey, 62 Ohio St.3d 353,362,595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1992). 
ATTACKS ON DEFENSE COUNSEL 
The prosecutor may not attack the defense attorney 
through argument. The Ohio Supreme Court criticized a 
prosecutor's argument that the defense attorneys "are paid 
to get him off the hook. . . . [T]his comment imputed insin-
cerity to defense counsel, thus suggesting that they be-
lieved Keenan guilty. It was therefore improper." State v. 
Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993). 
In a different case, the Court reversed a conviction due to 
misconduct: 
[T]he assistant prosecutor referred to defense evi-
dence as "lies," "garbage," "garbage lies," "[a] smoke 
screen," and "a well conceived and well rehearsed lie." 
In addition, the assistant prosecutor intimated that de-
fense counsel had suborned perjury by manufacturing, 
conceiving and fashioning lies to be presented in 
court. There was no evidence to substantiate these 
accusations. State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 
N.E.2d 883 (1984). 
See also State v. Braxton, 102 Ohio App.3d 28, 42, 656 
N.E.2d 970 (1995) ("in opining that the defense was getting 
up and hiding behind a smoke screen, the prosecutor im-
properly intimated that defense counsel 'had suborned per-
jury by manufacturing, conceiving and fashioning lies."') (cit-
ing Smith). 
The prosecutor in Keenan also commented, "Not once 
did [the defense attorneys] tell you their client was inno-
cent." This was also improper: "The personal opinion of the 
defense counsel of their client's guilt or innocence is no 
more relevant than the opinion of the prosecutor." State v. 
Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993). 
The rule prohibiting attacks on defense counsel also ap-
plies to comments made during trial. See State v. Keenan, 
66 Ohio St.3d 402, 406, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993) ("It is im-
proper to denigrate defense counsel in the jury's presence 
for making objections. Such conduct infringes on the defen-
dant's right to counsel and penalizes him for attempting to 
enforce procedural rights. . . . In light of Ohio's contempora-
neous-objection requirement, such conduct is especially 
reprehensible.") (citations omitted). 
EXTRANEOUS FACTORS 
The prosecutor "should refrain from argument which 
would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the 
evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused under the controlling law, or by mak-
ing predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict." 
ABA Criminal Justice Standards § 3-5.8{d) {2d ed. 1980). 
This includes arguments that an erroneous conviction can 
be reversed on appeal or that the defendant will commit fur-
ther crimes if acquitted. 3 LaFave & lsmel, Criminal 
Procedure § 23.5, at 34 (1984). Also, an "emotional appeal 
based on the public demand to stamp out the narcotics evil" 
is improper. State v. Cloud, 112 Ohio App. 208, 214, 168 
N.E.2d 761 (1960). 
Moreover, "[t]hreatening the jury in a criminal case that 
they will be branded as condoning crime if they acquit an 
accused is never permissible. The jury is not on trial. The 
issue is not whether the jury approves of crime, but whether 
the evidence shows the accused is guilty of it under the law:' 
State v. Davis, 60 Ohio App.2d 355, 362, 397 N.E.2d 1215 
{1978). ' 
In contrast, an "[a]rgument suggesting the jury 'send a 
message to the community' through its verdict was _not an 
exhortation to succumb to public dell)and, but was Instead 
more akin to a request to maintain community standards." 
State v. Napier, 105 Ohio App.3d 713, 725, 664 N.E.2d 
1330 {1995) (citing State v. Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 
490 N.E.2d 906 {1986) ("A request that the jury maint~in 
community standards is not equivalent to the exhortation 
that the jury succumb to public demand ... :')). 
GUILT BY ASSOCIATION 
"The prosecutor made another gravely improper argu-
ment when he used the bad character of Keenan's friends 
to attack Keenan's own character .... In relying on the 'thor-
oughly discredited doctrine' of guilt by association, the pros-
ecutor violated 'a fundamental principle of American ju-
risprudence, inhabiting a central place in the concept of due 
orocess.' A defendant cannot be adjudged guilty on the 
)round that he or she associates with bad people.'' State v. 
<eenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 409, 613 N.E.2d 203 {1993) 
:quoting People v. Chambers, 231 Cal. App.2d 23, 41 Cal. 
=lptr. 551,555 {1964)). 
COMMENT ON EXERCISE OF RIGHTS 
The prosecutor's argument may be improper because "it 
mplicate[s] other specific rights of the accused such as the 
ight to counsel or the right to remain silent." Darden v. 
Nainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 (1986). In addition, a "prose-
:utor's statements concerning Kendle's plea of guilty and 
1cceptance of responsibility for the same crimes for which 
!ppellant had been charged implied that appellant acted im-
>roperly by exercising his right to a jury trial." State v. 
-umbleson, 105 Ohio App.3d 693, 699-700,664 N.E.2d 
318 (1995). 
:ifth Amendment 
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the United 
4 
States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment pro-
hibits the use of an accused's failure to testify as evidence 
of guilt. The Court wrote: 
[Comment on the refusal to testify] is a penalty im-
posed by courts for exercising a constitutional privi-
lege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly. It is said, however, that the inference of guilt 
for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the ac-
cused's knowledge is in any event natural and irre-
sistible, and that comment on the failure does not mag-
nify that inference into a penalty for asserting a consti-
tutional privilege. What the jury may infer, given no 
help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer 
when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused 
into evidence against him is quite another. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment "for-
bids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's 
silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evi-
dence of guilt." ld. at 6_15. 
The Court limited Griffin in United States v. Robinson, 
485 U.S. 25 (1988), in which the defendant was convicted of 
mail fraud. The prosecution introduced a number of out-of-
court statements made by Robinson, who did not testify. In 
closing argument Robinson's counsel tried to minimize the 
prior statements by suggesting that his client had not been 
given the opportunity to explain his actions. In response, 
the prosecutor told the jury: "He could have taken the stand 
and explained it to you. The United States of America has 
given him, throughout, the opportunity to explain." ld. at 28. 
The Supreme Court distinguished Griffin. In the Court's 
view, it is one thing to use the Fifth Amendment as a shield; 
it is quite another thing to use it as a sword: 
Where the prosecutor on his own initiative asks the 
jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's 
silence, Griffin holds that the privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination is violated. But whereas in this 
case the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's op-
portunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made 
by defendant or his counsel, we think there is no viola-
tion of the privilege. ld. at 32. 
In addition, some prosecutorial comments have been 
ruled benign and not violative of the Griffin rule. For exam-
ple, where a prosecutor in final argument referred to the 
state's case as unrefuted and uncontradicted, reversal was 
not required because this comment added nothing to the 
impression already created by the defendant's failure to tes-
tify after her lawyer had promised the jury that the defendant 
would take the stand. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595 
(1978). Moreover, a "reference by the prosecutor in closing 
argument to uncontradicted evidence is not a comment on 
the accused's failure to testify, where the comment is direct-
ed to the strength of the state's evidence and not to the si-
lence of the accused, and where the jury is instructed ... to 
not consider the accused's failure to testify." State v. 
Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 19-20,490 NE(2d) 906 (1986). 
A Griffin error is subject to "harmless error'' analysis. In 
State v. Clark, 74 Ohio App.3d 151,598 N.E.2d 740 (1991), 
the defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery, ag-
gravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated murder. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor commented on 
the defendant's silence: "We weren't there. The only two 
people that were there was James Clark [the defendant] 
and George Donnelly [the victim]. George can't talk, Clark 
won't." The state must "demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I ~))Jilll ff 
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doubt that the prosecutor's comment did not contribute to 
each of [the defendant's] convictions." ld. at 158. The court 
of appeals held that the state demonstrated beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the prosecutor's comment during closing 
argument was harmless because there was overwhelming 
evidence of guilt on the aggravated robbery and aggravated 
burglary charges. However, the state failed to prove that the 
remark about silence did not influence the jury's delibera-
tions on the aggravated murder charges. The court held 
that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial on the 
aggravated murder charges. 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
Failure to Object 
Failure to object to improper argument constitutes a waiv-
er of the objection, and appellate review is then limited to 
plain error. See Grim R. 52(B); State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 
195,203,661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996) ("However, Hill failed to 
object to these remarks and thus waived all but plain error."); 
State v. Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 605 N.E.2d 916 (1992), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 833 (1993). 
Prejudice Requirement 
In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982), the United 
States Supreme Court remarked that ''the touchstone of 
due-process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial mis-
conduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor." In another case, the Court noted, "If every re-
mark made by counsel outside of the testimony were 
grounds for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would 
stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement 
of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally 
G carried away by this temptation." Dunlop v. United States, 
165 U.S. 486 (1897). 
Thus, even if the argument is improper, the defendant 
must still demonstrate prejudice. See State v. Benge, 75 
Ohio St.3d 136, 141, 661 N.E.2d 1019 (1 996) ("A conviction 
will be reversed only where it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, absent the prosecutor's comments, the jury 
would not have found appellant guilty."), cert. denied, 117 
S.Ct. 224 (1 996); State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 203, 661 
N.E.2d 1068 (1 996) ("[W]e find no prejudice to Hill in light of 
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt."); State v. Phillips, 74 
Ohio St.3d 72, 90, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1 995) (the issue is 
"whether the [prosecutor's] remarks prejudicially affected 
substantive rights of the defendant") State v. Appanovitch, 
33 Ohio St.3d 19, 24,514 N.E.2d 394 (1987) (''The conduct 
of a prosecuting attorney during trial cannot be made a 
ground of error unless the conduct deprives defendant of a 
fair trial."); State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14,470 N.E.2d 
883 (1 984) (''The test regarding prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing arguments is whether the remarks were improper 
·and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial 
rights of the defendant."). 
Entire Argument 
In determining the impropriety of final argument, courts 
view the argument as a whole. ''The closing argument must 
... be reviewed in its entirety to determine if the prosecu-
[ tor's remarks were prejudicial." State v. Oritz, 63 Ohio St.3d 
150, 157,407 N.E.2d 1268 (1980). See also Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1 986); Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,643-45 (1974); State v. 
Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402,410,613 N.E.2d 203 (1993) 
('We consider the effect the misconduct had on the jury in 
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the context of the entire trial."); State v. Byrd, 32 Ohio St.3d 
79, 82,512 N.E.2d 611 (1987). ' 
Consequently, "[i]solated comments by a prosecutor are 
not to be taken out of context and given their most damag-
ing meaning." State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St. 3d 1 95, 204, 661 
N.E.2d 1068 (1 996). See also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 
416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974) ("one moment in an extended 
trial"}; Berger v. United States, 295 u.s: 78, 89 (1935) ("[W]e 
have not here a case where the misconduct of the prosecut-
ing attorney was slight or confined to a single instance, but 
one where such misconduct was pronounced and persis-
tent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which 
cannot be disregarded as inconsequential."); State v. 
Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402,410,613 N.E.2d 203 (1993) 
("One factor relevant to the due-process analysis is whether 
the misconduct was an isolated incident in an otherwise 
properly tried case .... That was not true here. To the con-
trary, the prosecutor's errors were part of a protracted series 
of improper arguments, 'a textbook example of what a clos-
ing argument should not be."') (quoting State v. Liberatore, 
69 Ohio St.2d 583, 589,433 N.E.2d 561 (1982}). 
Curative Instructions 
Appellate courts often cite the giving of curative instruc-
tions in this context. In one case, the United States 
Supreme Court noted that the ''trial court took special pains 
to correct any impression that the jury could consider the 
prosecutor's statements as evidence in the case ..... [T]he 
judge directed the jury's attention to the remark particularly 
challenged here, declared it to be unsupported, and admon-
ished the jury to ignore it." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 
U.S. 637, 644 (1 97 4). See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168, 182 (1 986} (''The trial court instructed the jurors 
several times that their decision was to be made on the 
basis of the evidence alone, and that the arguments of 
counsel were not evidence."). In contrast, in State v. 
Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402,410,613 N.E.2d 203 (1993), 
"[t]he trial court gave no curative instruction; indeed, it over-
ruled an objection, giving the prosecutor's comment its ap-
proval in the jury's eyes." (citation omitted) 
Invited Response 
The courts have also recognized the doctrine of invited 
response - whether the argument was "invited" by some-
thing said by the defense. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168, 182 (1986) ("Much of the objectionable content 
was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation 
of the defense."); State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402,410, 
613 N.E.2d 203 (1993). This doctrine, however, does not 
mean that any response, no matter how improper, is accept-
able. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1 985), the 
United States Supreme Court elaborated: 
In retrospect, perhaps the idea of "invited response" 
has evolved in a way not contemplated .... [T]he earli-
er cases ... should not be read as suggesting judicial 
approval or- encouragement - of response-in-kind 
that inevitably exacerbate the tensions inherent in the 
adversary process. . . . [T]he issue is not the prosecu-
tor's license to make otherwise improper arguments, 
but whether the prosecutor's "invited response," taken 
in context, unfairly prejudiced the defendant. 
Bench Trials 
Another factor is whether the case involved a jury or 
bench trial because "in a bench trial, trial judges are pre-
sumed to rely only upon relevant, material, and competent 
evidence, in arriving at their judgments." State v. Richey, 62 
Ohio St.3d 353, 362, 595 N.E.2d 915 (1992), cert. denied, 
507 U.S. 989 (1992). In State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 
86,571 N.E.2d 97 (1991), the Ohio Supreme Court stated: 
Appellant correctly contends that this evidence and ar-
gument constituted an irrelevant appeal to the emo-
tions. However, in reviewing a bench trial, an appel-
late court presumes that the trial court considered 
nothing but relevant and competent evidence in reach-
ing its verdict. The presumption may be overcome 
only by an affirmative showing to the contrary by the 
appellant. 
State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754 
(1987). 
Broad Leeway 
Moreover, courts have traditionally given the attorneys 
much freedom in closing argument. As the Ohio Supreme 
Court has noted, "wide latitude is given to counsel during 
closing argument to present their most convincing posi-
tions." State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 90, 656 N.E.2d 
643 (1995). See also State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 
26, 215 N.E.2d 568 (1966) ("some latitude and freedom of 
expression"). Learned Hand once wrote that "the truth is 
not likely to emerge, if the prosecution is confined to such 
detached exposition as would be appropriate in a lecture, 
while the defense is allowed those appeals in misericordiam 
[sic] which long custom has come to sanction." United 
States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. de-
nied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936). 
DEFENSE COUNSEL 
Much of the misconduct discussed above also applies to 
defense counsel, because "both prosecutor and defense 
counsel are subject to the same general limitations in the 
scope of their argument." ABA Criminal Justice Standards 
227 (3d ed. 1993). ''This means that a defense attorney 
should not (1) intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead 
the jury as to the inferences it may draw, (2) express a per-
sonal belief or opinion in his client's innocence or in the truth 
or falsity of any testimony or evidence, (3) attribute the 
crime to another person unless such an inference is war-
ranted by the evidence, (4) make arguments calculated to 
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury, or (5) make 
[arguments that divert the jury from it duty to decide cases 
on the evidence]." 3 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 
23.5(c), at 37 (1984). 
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